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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 950408-CA 
v. : 
ROLANDO CALEB BECKER, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from convictions for auto theft, a second 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-404 (1995), 
tampering with evidence, a second degree felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-510 (1995), escape from custody, a class B 
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-309 (1995), 
and unlawful possession of a controlled substance, a class B 
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2) (a) (i) 
(Supp. 1995), in the Fourth Judicial District Court. This Court 
has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) 
(Supp. 1995). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Should this court consider a challenge concerning the 
seating of jurors who are no alleged to have been actually 
biased? An appellate court may decline to review issues held to 
be without merit. State v. Allen. 839 P.2d 291, 303 (Utah 1992) 
("In accord with the established principles of review applicable 
to all cases, civil and criminal, we decline to analyze and 
address in writing every issue or claim raised.") (footnote 
omitted); State v. Carter. 776 P.2d 886, 888-89 (Utah 1989) 
(same). Alternatively, did the trial court properly seat one 
juror challenged for cause and other unchallenged jurors? A 
trial court's decision not to dismiss a juror challenged for 
cause is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. State 
V. Saunders, 893 P.2d 584, 587 (Utah App. 1995), cert, granted. 
P.2d (Utah October 31, 1995). Where defendant on appeal 
claims error in seating jurors who should have been removed for 
cause, but were not challenged below, the appellate court uses a 
plain error standard of review. State v. Brooks. 868 P.2d 818, 
821 (Utah App. 1994), aff'&. 908 P.2d 856 (Utah 1995). 
2. Did the trial court properly find that probable cause 
and defendant's consent justified a search of the car? The 
appellate court reviews underlying factual findings for clear 
error. State v. Poole. 871 P.2d 531, 533 (Utah 1994). The trial 
court's legal conclusion of probable cause is reviewed for 
correctness, affording some measure of discretion to the trial 
court. Id. 
3. Did the trial court properly refuse defendant's request 
for a lesser included offense instruction? An appeal of the 
trial court's refusal to give a lesser included offense 
instruction presents a question of law reviewed for correctness. 
State v. Mincy. 838 P.2d 648, 658 (Utah App.), cert, denied. 843 
2 
P.2d 1042 (Utah 1992). 
4. Did the trial court properly admit testimony concerning 
the contents of the sack defendant fled with? Admissibility of 
evidence is reviewed for correctness, incorporating a "clearly 
erroneous" standard for the review of the underlying factual 
findings. State v. Reed. 820 P.2d 479, 481 (Utah App. 1991) 
(citing State v. Ramirez. 817 P.2d 774, 781 n.3 (Utah 1991)). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND BSLE& 
The following constitutional provisions, statutes and rules 
pertinent to this issues on appeal are fully set out Addendum A: 
Amendments 4 and 5, United States Constitution; 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1995); 
Utah Code Ann, § 76-8-510 (1995); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-401 (1995); 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 41-la-1311, -1314 (1993); 
Rule 18, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure; 
Rules 401 - 404, Utah Rules of Evidence 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Rolando Caleb Becker, was charged with auto 
theft, a second degree felony (Count I), tampering with evidence, 
a second degree felony (Count II), escape from custody, a class B 
misdemeanor) (Count III), and unlawful possession of a controlled 
substance, a class B misdemeanor (Count IV) (R. l). Defendant 
made a motion in limine to exclude the investigating officer's 
opinion that a substance found in a sack was either 
methamphetamine or crack cocaine (R. 127). Defendant also moved 
to suppress evidence following the officer's search of the car 
defendant was riding in (R. 171). Both motions were denied (R. 
3 
162; T. 24-27, 54-55, 59-60). 
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of all 
counts (R. 374-78). The trial court sentenced defendant to the 
statutory terms of one-to-fifteen years inprisonment on Counts I 
and II, and terms of six months in the Juab County Jail on Counts 
III and IV, all terms to be served concurrently (R. 302). The 
court stayed execution of the sentences and placed defendant on 
probation for a period of thirty-six months (R. 302). The trial 
court denied defendant's petition for a certificate of probable 
cause (R. 325). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The facts recited below were taken from the transcript of 
the hearing on the motion to suppress and the trial. On appeal, 
those facts are recited in a light most favorable to the trial 
court's findings and the jury's verdict. State v. Delaney, 869 
P.2d 4, 5 (Utah App. 1994) (trial court's findings); State v. 
Strausbera. 895 P.2d 831, 832 (Utah App. 1995) (jury's verdict). 
At about 11:45 on the morning of October 7, 1993, Sargeant 
Paul Mangelson, a 27-year veteran of the Utah Highway Patrol, 
observed a blue 1993 Mercury Sable on 1-15 traveling at 76 miles 
per hour in a 65 mile per hour zone (T. 16-18, 37). The officer 
stopped, which had two people in it besides the driver, and asked 
the driver, Lisa LaBarrie, for her driver's license and 
registration (T. 18-19). Sargeant Mangelson, who has arrested 
hundreds of people for marijuana and cocaine related offenses, 
4 
smelled the odor of burnt marijuana "almost immediately" upon 
approaching the open driver's window (T. 17, 20, 43). 
LaBarrie said the car was a rental and that her driver's 
license was in her purse, which was in the trunk (T. 19). She 
retrieved her license from the trunk, and the officer determined 
that LaBarrie was properly licensed and the car properly 
registered; however, none of the persons in the car was the 
lessee (T. 19, 43). LaBarrie explained that another person had 
rented the car, but that defendant, who sat beside her in the 
passenger seat, was listed as an additional driver in the rental 
agreement (T. 20, 45). Sargeant Mangelson also examined 
defendant's license, which he retained (T. 48). 
Upon concluding that the group appeared to be properly in 
possession of the car, Sargeant Mangelson asked the group if they 
were using marijuana (T. 20, 46). Upon their denial, the officer 
said: "I can smell it plain as day. I know you are using it" (T. 
46), whereupon defendant admitted that they smoked a "joint," 
gesturing towards the ashtray (T. 20, 46). Sargeant Mangelson 
then retrieved a "roach" from the ashtray (T. 21)-1 
Sargeant Mangelson then asked if there was more marijuana in 
the car, and the group denied it (T. 21). The officer asked if 
he could look through the car, and defendant answered, "Go ahead" 
(T. 22), whereupon Sargeant Mangelson patted down each person for 
1
 A "roach" is the butt of a "joint," a marijuana cigarette 
(T. 21). The roach was admitted into evidence as Exhibit 1 at 
both the suppression hearing and at trial (T. 21, 159). 
5 
weapons and had them stand off to the side where he could watch 
them and they would be out of traffic (T. 22). In the interior 
of the car, he found a baggie of marijuana stuffed under the back 
seat (T. 22). 
Sargeant Mangelson then asked the driver to open the trunk 
(T. 23). LaBarrie retrieved the keys from the ignition and 
opened the trunk (T. 23). After searching the driver's purse and 
other bags, the officer pulled back some carpeting at the rear of 
the compartment and found a paper sack weighing between a half 
to a full pound (T. 23-24) . Inside the sack there was a plastic 
bag containing an off-white, rocky substance, which in the 
officer's experience appeared to be either crack cocaine or 
methamphetamine (T. 24-27). 
At trial, Sargeant Mangelson further testified that he asked 
driver who owned the sack, but she denied any knowledge of it (T. 
163-64). At this point defendant started towards the driver's 
side of the car, got behind the wheel and reached for the keys to 
start the car, but they were still in the trunk (T. 164). The 
officer moved to the front of the car, placing the sack on top of 
the car (T. 164). As defendant exited the car, Sargeant 
Mangelson grabbed him by the arms and told defendant he was under 
arrest (T. 164). While the officer was reaching for his 
handcuffs, defendant broke free, grabbed the sack, moved to the 
back of the car and then to the edge of the freeway (T. 165). 
Sargeant Mangelson drew his gun and ordered defendant to stop, 
€ 
but defendant turned, looked at the officer, announced that the 
officer could not shoot him because he was unarmed and continued 
to run, crossing the freeway fence (T. 165). 
From his elevated vantage point on the freeway, Sargeant 
Mangelson watched defendant run across the freeway fence, over 
the railroad tracks towards a Tri-Mart Texaco about 600 feet away 
where a mustard colored car was parked, the paper sack still in 
his hands (T. 165-66, 193). Defendant got into the car. Just 
then a woman screamed, nMy car, my car." She jumped on the hood 
and pounded on the windshield for defendant to stop, but 
defendant put the car in reverse, throwing the woman off, and 
drove onto Highway 28 (T. 165-66). 
At this point Trooper Jim Hillan happened to drive up, and 
Mangelson, preoccupied with LaBarrie and the other passenger, 
told Trooper Hillan that defendant had just escaped and was 
driving away in the mustard colored stationwagon, still in their 
view (T. 161, 166-67, 189). Trooper Hillan pursued defendant. 
Within a couple of minutes Trooper Charlie Wilson, responding to 
Sargeant Mangelson's radio call, arrived and took custody of 
LaBarrie and the other passenger, allowing Sargeant Mangelson to 
give chase (T. 167, 328-29). 
Hearing that Trooper Hillan failed to overtake defendant, 
Sargeant Mangelson turned off the highway onto another road and 
found the car abandoned about one and a half miles further. It 
had been driven through a barbed-wire fence and over rocks, the 
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muffler had been ripped off and it would not start (T. 167-68, 
174, 195-196)• Neither defendant nor the sack could be found (T. 
168) . 
Further search, utilizing a helicopter and dogs, failed to 
locate defendant (T. 169). The following morning defendant, 
having spent the night in a haystack, came into a Circle C Truck 
Stop outside of Levan and was apprehended without incident (T. 
170, 196-97, 226). When Sargeant Mangelson asked him about the 
sack, defendant denied it existed (T. 171). 
A search of the farm where defendant was thought to have 
spent the night failed to uncover the sack (T. 172). During an 
inventory search of the car driven by LaBarrie, rolling papers 
and marijuana were found (T. 172-73). 
Only Lisa LaBarrie testified for the defense. In substance, 
she claimed responsibility for having smoked the marijuana prior 
to being stopped and for the marijuana found in the car (T. 279, 
296). She denied that a Mroach" was found in the ashtray (T. 
281-82), denied there was a paper sack (T. 285, 305) or and 
denied seeing defendant abscond with the mustard colored car (T. 
311) . 
SUMMARY OP ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
Defendant's claims, i.e., trial court error and ineffective 
assistance of counsel regarding the seating of jurors who 
allegedly should have been removed for cause, fails because there 
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is no claim, nor does the record show, that any of the jurors 
were actually biased. Moreover, the trial court did not abuse 
its discretion in refusing defendant's challenge for cause to a 
juror who had a neglible connection with the prosecutor. As to 
two jurors challenged on appeal but who were not challenged in 
the trial court, defendant has failed to show that their 
retention was either plain error or ineffective assistance of 
counsel. Voir dire did not raise and inference of bias 
concerning one juror who had only pleasant memories of the 
prosecutor and the investigating officer when he was their high 
school principal many years earlier, or about another juror whose 
step-daughter had been convicted of a drug offense. Furthermore, 
considering the presumption favoring attorney competence, and 
given counsel was fully engaged in jury selection, his allowing 
the questioned jurors to remain cannot be considered ineffective 
assistance of counsel. 
POINT II 
Defendant's motion to suppress was properly denied for 
several reasons. First, the trial court properly found that the 
smell of marijauna gave the investigating officer probable cause 
to search the entire car, under the Fourth Amendment. Further, 
while a showing of exigent circumstances is required under both 
the federal and state constitutions, defendant failed to preserve 
his claim as to the applicability of the state constitution or 
the existence of exigent circumstances. In any case, those 
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circumstances existed given the moveability of the car, the 
isolated location of the stop and the number of suspects. 
Second, defendant gave his voluntary consent to search the 
car. Further, there is no need to consider whether the consent 
was attenuated from a prior illegality because there was none 
under the Fourth Amendment. Further, there was no Miranda 
violation because defendant was not subjected to the type of 
interrogation as was the defendant in State v. Mirquet 268 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 3 (1995), upon which defendant exclusively relies. 
Even if there was a Mirquet-Miranda violation, that violation 
does not consitute a violation of constitutional dimension which 
would trigger an exploitation/attenuation analysis. Also, since 
there was no evidence of coercion, the marijuana discovered in 
the car was admissible as derivative physical evidence. 
POINT III 
Defendant was not entitled to a lesser included offense 
instruction on class A misdemeanor joyriding because there was no 
rational basis in the evidence that he intended only to 
temporarily deprive the owner of possession of the car he stole. 
The defense was that he had not stolen the car at all, thus 
precluding a conviction on the requested lesser offense. Even if 
there was an error in withholding the requested instruction, it 
was harmless because the jury refused to convict defendant of the 
given lesser included offense of third-degree felony joyriding. 
Therefore, it is logically impossible that the jury would have 
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found defendant guilty of class A misdemeanor joyriding, even if 
that option had been given. 
Point IV 
Because defendant has failed to include in the record the 
transcript of the hearing in which the trial court denied his 
motion seeking to exclude the investigating officer's opinion of 
the contents of the sack defendant fled with, the Court should 
refuse to consider the matter. In any case, defendant's 
contention that it is inadmissible to identify the nature of the 
investigation in which evidence is tampered with is without 
merit. Even if it was improper to admit testimony of the 
contents of the sack, the error was harmless because the evidence 
is compelling that defendant fled with the sack, thus proving the 
offense. 
ARgUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT FAILS TO SHOW EITHER TRIAL COURT 
ERROR OR INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
WHERE THE RECORD SHOWS THAT ANY INFERENCE OF 
BIAS CONCERNING THE THREE JURORS CHALLENGED 
ON APPEAL WAS SUCCESSFULLY REBUTTED AT TRIAL 
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in seating Wayne 
Conner, Clark Newell and Clyde Elmer on the jury because they 
should have been removed for cause. Appellant's Br. at 21. 
Recognizing that trial counsel did not challenge Newell and 
Elmer, defendant argues in the alternative that the seating of 
these jurors was plain error or the result of ineffective 
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assistance of counsel. Appellant's Br- at 28. However, because 
defendant only alleges that voir dire raised an inference of bias 
with respect to these jurors, as opposed to its revealing actual 
bias, defendant's claim fails at the outset. Further, because 
voir dire of all of these jurors failed to uncover even an 
inference of bias and was adequate to rebut any inference of bias 
that might have existed, the trial court did not err in seating 
these jurors. Additionally, because counsel was fully engaged in 
the jury selection process and because the jurors could not 
reasonably be challenged for cause, trial counsel was not 
ineffective in choosing neither to challenge the jurors for cause 
or remove them with peremptory challenges. 
A. Defendant's Claim Fails Because It Does Not Allege 
Actual Bias 
In State v. Menzies. the court overruled the automatic 
reversal rule announced in Crawford v. Manning. 542 P.2d 1091 
(Utah 1975), where reversal was mandated whenever a party was 
compelled u'to exercise a peremptory challenge to remove a panel 
member who should have been stricken for cause.'" State v. 
Menzies. 889 P.2d 393, 398 (Utah 1994) (quoting State v. Bishop. 
753 P.2d 439, 451 (Utah 1988), cert, denied. 115 S. Ct. 910 
(1995). The court held: *To prevail on a claim of error based on 
the failure to remove a juror for cause, a defendant must 
demonstrate prejudice, viz., show that a member of the jury was 
partial or incompetent." Id. 
Defendant only alleges that voir dire raised an inference of 
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bias as to all jurors now challenged on appeal, as opposed to its 
revealing actual bias. Appellant's Br. at 21. Therefore, 
defendant's claim is fatally flawed at the outset.2 However, 
even under a pre-Menzies analysis, defendant's claim fails. 
B. The Trial Court Properly Denied A Challenge For 
Cause to Juror Conner 
wIn order to succeed on appeal, a defendant must show that a 
juror's responses to voir dire questions or other facts in the 
record raised an inference that the juror harbored some bias, and 
then demonstrate that the trial court failed to adequately probe 
and then rebut that inference." Saunders. 893 P.2d at 587 
(citations omitted). wThe scope of the voir dire is left to the 
* sound discretion of the trial court because only the trial court 
knows when it is satisfied that a prospective juror is 
impartial." Brooks. 868 P.2d at 822 (citations omitted). 
During voir dire the trial court asked the panel if any of 
them was acquainted with Mr. Eyre, the prosecutor, Mr. Mangelson 
or other witnesses in the case (T. 69). Mr. Conner said, wMr. 
2
 Defendant's claim would appear even further compromised 
because he did not even exercise a peremptory challenge against 
juror Conner, the only panelist he challenged for cause. This 
Court recently rejected the State's argument that a defendant 
waives his challenge to the seating of a juror who should have 
been removed for cause by failing to use a peremptory challenge 
against that juror. State v. Baker. 884 P.2d 1280 (Utah App. 
1995). However, the State's petition for writ of certiorari was 
granted in that case, 892 P.2d 13 (Utah 1995), and argument has 
been heard. To the extent that Baker presently governs, it is 
not applicable because it concerned a juror who was admittedly 
biased, whereas in this case neither defendant's allegations on 
appeal nor the record show that Conner was actually biased. 
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Eyre did write a letter for my grandmother's estate for me (T. 
72), moving the court to conduct make further inquiries: 
THE COURT: How long ago was it? 
MR. WAYNE CONNER: Approximately three months 
ago. 
THE COURT: Does that complete your 
transactions with Mr. Eyre? 
MR. WAYNE CONNER: Yes sir. 
THE COURT: He is not doing anything further 
on this estate? 
MR. WAYNE CONNER: No sir. 
THE COURT: Has he represented you in other 
matters? 
MR. WAYNE CONNER: No sir. 
THE COURT: Have you paid your bill? 
MR. WAYNE CONNER: Yes sir. 
THE COURT: He doesn't owe you any further 
favors? 
MR. WAYNE CONNER: No sir? 
THE COURT: As a result of that acquaintance, 
would you be prejudicial for or against either 
party in this case? 
MR. WAYNE CONNER: No sir. 
THE COURT: Can you set that acquaintance aside 
and fairly and impartially decide this case 
solely on the evidence presented in this 
courtroom? 
MR. WAYNE CONNER: Yes sir. 
(T. 72-73). 
Defendant challenged Conner for cause, recognizing, however, 
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that the prosecutor had represented Conner's grandmother's 
estate, not Conner himself (T. 116). Thereafter, Mr. Eyre 
explained, "All I did was write a letter for he and his brother. 
His grandmother's estate was being probated back on the East 
Coast. I just wrote a letter to an attorney back there" (R. 
116). Later, the trial court denied defendant's motion (R. 128). 
Neither defendant nor the prosecutor exercised a peremptory 
challenge against Conner, and he sat on the jury (T. 131). 
Rule 18(e)(4), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides 
that a challenge for cause may be taken against a juror who has a 
legal or other relationship with a party which "when viewed 
objectively, would suggest to reasonable minds that the 
prospective juror would be unable or unwilling to return a 
verdict which would be free of favoritism." Utah R. Crim. P. 
18(e)(4). Relying on this provision and State v. Cox. 826 P.2d 
656 (Utah App. 1992), defendant claims the trial court erred in 
not striking Conner. Neither rule 18(e)(4) nor Cox support 
defendant's argument. 
In Cox, the challenged juror and the prosecutor had a "long 
term [attorney-client] relationship, renewed periodically when 
legal services were sought." Cox. 826 P.2d at 660. On the basis 
of "that relationship of respect and trust," this Court held that 
the juror could not act with impartiality. Id. 
Plainly, Conner's connection with Mr. Eyre is of an entirely 
different order. The trial court's voir dire and colloquy with 
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counsel elicited that (1) no attorney-client relationship existed 
between the juror and the prosecutor, (2) the connection 
consisted of a single event, i.e., the writing of a letter in 
connection with the probate of the juror's grandmother's estate, 
and (3) apart from writing the letter, there was no relationship 
between the juror and the prosecutor. Moreover, to the extent 
that any inference of bias may have attached to this one-time 
event, the trial court rebutted the inference through two 
questions to which the juror unequivocally answered that he could 
act without prejudice to either party and weigh the evidence 
impartially (T. 72-73). Cf. State v. Lacey. 665 P.2d 1311, 1312 
(Utah 1983) (per curiam) (upholding denial of challenge for cause 
to juror who had recently been treated by a physician testifying 
as a prosecution witness). On these facts the trial court 
properly concluded that Conner would be able to render a verdict 
free of favoritism. 
C. The Trial Court did not Commit Plain Error. Nor 
rep Tri»i Counsel Ineffective in Seating Jurors 
Newell anfl Eliner 
Defendant claims that the seating of jurors Newell and Elmer 
resulted from both plain error and ineffective assistance of 
counsel. Appellant's Br. at 28. Even under the less stringent 
abuse of discretion standard, defendant's claim fails. 
*Where, on appeal, defendant challenges the trial court's 
failure to remove prospective jurors and# at trial defense 
counsel did not move to strike the prospective jurors for cause, 
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[the appellate court] utilize[s] a 'plain error' standard of 
review." Brooks. 868 P.2d at 821 (citations omitted). The 
requirements for determining whether plain error has occurred are 
threefold: (1) an error has occurred, which is (2) obvious and 
(3) affects the substantial rights of the accused, i.e., 
prejudicial. State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993). 
In order to establish a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel, defendant must show that counsel's performance was 
deficient by identifying specific acts or omissions which, under 
the circumstances of the particular case, demonstrate that 
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 "counsel fs representation fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness.111 State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 
1990) (quoting Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 688, 104 
S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984)). Second, defendant must establish the 
prejudice prong by lfaffirmatively show[ing] that a reasonable 
probability exists that except for ineffective counsel, the 
result would have been different." State v. Lovell. 758 P.2d 
909, 913 (Utah 1988). "Defendant has the burden of demonstrating 
that counsel's 'performance fell below an objective standard of 
reasonable professional judgment,' and that counsel's actions 
were not conscious trial strategy." State v. Ellifritz. 835 P.2d 
170, 174 (Utah App. 1992). *[The reviewing court] %indulges a 
strong prresumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide 
range of reasonable professional assistance . . . .'" Brooks. 
868 P.2d at 822 (citations omitted). A common standard of 
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prejudice is applied when both plain error and ineffective 
assistance of counsel is asserted on appeal. Id. 
Jurer Kayae Newell 
In answer to the court's question about being acquainted 
with the prosecutor and any of his witnesses, Newell answered 
that he had been the high school principal to Mr. Eyre, Mr. 
Mangelson and some other troopers, whose names he could not 
remember (T. 76). The following colloquy ensued: 
THE COURT: Well, being their High School 
Principal, did that prejudice you in any 
fashion against any of them? 
MR. CLARK NEWELL: Well, I had a pretty 
good regard for them, beyond that I don't 
think so. 
THE COURT: Didn't give you a lot of trouble? 
MR. CLARK NEWELL: Not especially no, 
THE COURT: As a result of your acquaintance 
with the police officers and Mr. Eyre, would 
you be prejudice [sic] for or against either 
party in this case? 
MR. CLARK NEWELL: I don't think so. 
THE COURT: And you could set aside that 
acquaintance and fairly and impartially 
try this case based on the evidence that 
has come forth in this courtroom? 
MR. CLARK NEWELL: Yes. 
(T. 76). 
The relationships between Newell on the one hand and Mr. 
Eyre and Sargeant Mangelson on the other are akin to that at 
issue in State v. Cobb. 774 P.2d 1123 (Utah 1989). In that case 
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the juror had known the prosecutor fifteen years before when he 
was a senior in high school for about a year, during which time 
the juror's daughter and the prosecutor were friends. Id. at 
1126. Additionally, the juror's and the prosecutor's families 
belonged to the same church organization, and she remembered him 
as a "nice kid." Id. The court found that the juror's brief 
acquaintance with the prosecutor was "not the type of 
relationship that would warrant an inference of bias, especially 
in light of a later statement where she expressed no doubts about 
her ability to decide the case impartially . . . ." Id. See 
also State v. Hewitt. 689 P.2d 22, 25-26 (Utah 1984) (no abuse of 
discretion in denying challenge for cause to juror who had gone 
to high school twenty years previously with one of the detectives 
on the case); State v. Gray. 851 P.2d 1217, 1222-23 (Utah App.) 
(no abuse of discretion in denying challenge for cause against 
juror who had served on the highway patrol for three years in the 
same rural county fifteen years earlier and knew the sheriff), 
cert, denied/ 860 p.2d 943 (Utah 1993). Compare State v, Brooks/ 
563 P.2d 799, 800-01 (Utah 1977) (error in seating one juror who 
was a neighbor and friend of the victim and attended the same LDS 
ward, and another juror who was good friends with a testifying 
police officer and had a business relationship with the police 
officer's wife). 
Considering that the threshold requirements necessary to 
show that the trial court committed plain error are much higher 
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than those required to show that the trial court abused its 
discretion, Brooks. 868 P.2d at 824, it is apparent that the 
trial court's seating juror Newell is not reversible error. 
Sargeant Mangelson testified that he was a twenty-seven year 
veteran of the Utah Highway Patrol (T. 16). Discussions 
concerning another juror indicated that Mr. Eyre had been 
practicing law for at least eighteen years (T. 126). Juror 
Newell's statement clearly suggests that he was acquainted with 
Mr. Eyre and Sargeant Mangelson only when they were high school 
students, without any subsequent relationship. On these facts 
defendant could not been prejudiced by either the trial court's 
seating juror Newell or the conduct of his counsel. Any 
inference of bias was dispelled by Newell's repeated assertions 
that he could judge the case fairly and impartially. 
Juror Clycte Elmer 
Clyde Elmer answered the trial court's inquiry about whether 
a family member had ever been a crime victim: 
MR. CLYDE ELMER: I have a step daughter that 
was a victim of drugs. 
THE COURT: Victim of drugs? 
MR. CLYDE ELMER: Yes. 
THE COURT: When you say na victim of drugs" 
what do you mean by that? 
MR. CLYDE ELMER: She was put on trial and 
sentenced. 
THE COURT: I see so she was actually a 
defendant in a criminal case? 
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MR. CLYDE ELMER: Yes. 
THE COURT: Is that locally here? 
MR. CLYDE ELMER: Yes. 
THE COURT: Is there any bias or prejudice 
created for or against either party as a 
result of that experience? 
MR. CLYDE ELMER: No. 
THE COURT: Could you fairly and impartially 
try this case based on the testimony and 
evidence that you would hear in the courtroom? 
MR. CLYDE ELMER: Yes, I believe I could. 
(T. 94-95). 
In State v. Tennyson, a burglary case, this Court examined a 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on counsel's 
failure to challenge for cause three jurors who had previously 
been burglary victims and who had initially equivocated on 
whether they could act impartially. State v. Tennyson. 850 P.2d 
461, 463-64 (Utah App. 1993). Noting that it was unaware of any 
automatic rule of disqualification of prospective jurors whose 
relatives might have been victims of crimes similar to that at 
issue in the case, and refusing to second-guess trial counsel's 
trial tactics, the Court affirmed the conviction. Id, at 469-70. 
No inference of bias is raised by juror Elmer's responses. 
Indeed, his perception of his step-daughter as the victim of 
crime, rather than a perpetrator, suggests that he would be 
sympathetically inclined towards defendant rather than 
prejudiced. Moreover, any inference of bias was rebutted by his 
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repeated assertions that he could act fairly and impartially. His 
retention on the jury was plainly not error. 
D. Counsel was Fully Engaged in Jury Selection 
In Ellifritz. where the defendant on appeal argued both 
plain error and ineffective assistance of counsel in challenging 
the seating of a juror, the Court held that Milt is clear from 
the record of the in-chambers session, that defense counsel 
intentionally, not through inadvertence, decided not to challenge 
the four jurors for cause and to exercise peremptory challenges 
to three of them." 835 P.2d at 177. The record is*abundantly 
clear that trial counsel in this case also was actively involved 
in jury selection and did not inadvertently fail to challenge 
Newell and Elmer. 
Typical of trial counsel's perspicacity and involvement in 
jury selection generally was his ultimate selection of Conner, 
despite his initial challenge. Conner initially appeared 
objectionable, not only because he seemed to have some 
association with the prosecutor, but also because he was 
acquainted with another questionable juror, Bruce Hall, who was 
Conner's mother's employer, a friend of the family and someone 
who might influence Conner's opinion (T. 82-83). Counsel also 
challenged Hall for cause because Hall, as County Health 
Inspector, clearly had a professional connection with the 
prosecutor (T. 114-15). Counsel also recalled that during voir 
dire Hall had referred to Mr. Eyre using the prosecutor's first 
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name and that Hall had deferred to the prosecutor's view as to 
nature of complaint Hall had once filed (T. 92, 115). At about 
this point the prosecutor explained his minor connection with 
Conner (T. 116). Thereafter, in considering counsel's challenge 
to Conner, the court suggested that Conner might not be 
objectionable if Hall were not on the jury (T. 116). Trial 
counsel acknowledged the validity of the observation, and 
suggested they pass the matter momentarily, which allowed both he 
and the trial court to weigh the matter as jury selection 
progressed (T. 116). Ultimately, the trial court granted 
counsel's challenge for cause against Hall (T. 128). 
It is apparent that once Conner's minimal connection to the 
prosecutor had been explained and Hall had been struck for cause, 
there existed no reason for continuing to challenge Conner. 
Indeed, considering counsel's obvious deliberation over Conner 
and his refusal to exercise a peremptory challenge against the 
juror, it would appear that counsel deliberately abandoned his 
challenge for cause against Conner. 
Counsel deliberated about other jurors just as long and 
carefully and as he did about Conner (T. 113-130). He 
successfully challenged four jurors for cause (T. 128). 
Thereafter, he exercised all four of his peremptory challenges 
(R. 174). Although there is nothing in the record to clearly 
suggest why counsel selected certain jurors and rejected others, 
his obvious engagement in the selection process indicates that 
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his choices were not inadvertent. As this Court observed in 
Tennyson, u[f]or all we know, [the juror that the defense counsel 
did not exercise a peremptory challenge against] was the most 
attentive juror, or the only one who glanced disparagingly at the 
prosecution or sympathetically toward the defendant." Tennyson. 
850 P.2d at 469. However, given counsel's obvious engagement in 
selecting his jury and the strong presumption that trial counsel 
rendered adequate assistance and used reasonable professional 
judgment, this Court should reject defendant's claim. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY POUND THAT SEIZURE 
OP EVIDENCE WAS BASED ON PROBABLE CAUSE AND 
DEFENDANT'S VOLUNTARY CONSENT TO SEARCH, AND 
CORRECTLY, IMPLICITLY REJECTED DEPENDANT'S 
CLAIM THAT HIS MIRANDA RIGHTS WERE VIOLATED; 
FURTHER, THE DERIVATIVE PHYSICAL EVIDENCE WAS 
PROPERLY ADMISSIBLE EVEN IF THERE WAS A 
MIRANDA VIOLATION 
Defendant principally argues that he was entitled to 
warnings under Miranda v. Arizona. 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602 
(1966), prior to Sargeant Mangelson's inquiring about marijuana, 
based on State v. Mircruet. 268 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (Utah 1995) , 
rehearing pending. Because Miranda warnings were not given, he 
argues, all evidence recovered from a search of the rental car 
should have been suppressed. Appellant's Br. at 27-28. 
Secondarily, defendant argues that even though there might have 
been probable cause to search the passenger compartment of the 
car, the warrantless search of the trunk was impermissible. 
Appellant's Br. at 29. Further, he claims, defendant's consent 
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to search the car was the product of a Miranda violation and was 
not attenuated from that alleged prior illegality. Appellant's 
Br. at 30. Finally, defendant urges this Court to refuse to 
consider that marijuana, i.e., derivative physical evidence, 
should be admitted after a failure to give Miranda warnings. 
Appellant's Br. at 31. Neither the facts nor the applicable law 
support defendant's claims.3 
A. The Odor of Burnt Marijuana Provided Probable 
Cause to Search the Car Entirely 
1. The Existence of Probable Cause 
"A search and seizure conducted without a warrant, like the 
search of defendant's vehicle, 'is unreasonable per se unless it 
falls within a recognized exception to the warrant requirement of 
the fourth amendment.'11 State v. Naisbitt. 827 P.2d 969, 972 
(Utah App. 1992) (citations omitted). One of the well-recognized 
exceptions to the warrant requirement is the odor of marijuana 
found emanating from a vehicle. Id,: State v. Dudley. 847 P.2d 
424, 426 (Utah App. 1993). 
After Sargeant Mangelson testified at the suppression 
hearing, the court made the following preliminary findings: 
[T]here is no evidence to the contrary in 
this hearing. The evidence is clear that the 
officer made a traffic stop. He clocked him 
in excess of the speed limit. There was a 
valid traffic stop and that stop was 
3
 Defendant does not claim that if this Court found that 
the search of the car was unconstitutional that the evidence 
tampering charge should be dismissed. State v. Wagstaff. 846 
P.2d 1311 (Utah App.), 857 P.2d 948 (Utah 1993). 
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appropriate. There is not evidence to the 
contrary at all. He approached the vehicle 
and he smelled Marijuana, burnt Marijuana, 
and immediately upon approaching the vehicle, 
smelled burnt Marijuana. He asked them if 
there was Marijuana and if they had been 
using it and they said, "No." He replied 
that I can smell it. 
Then Mr. Becker, the evidence in front of 
this court, is that Mr. Becker then said that 
we smoked a roach and gestured to the 
ashtray. The officer then retrieved the 
roach from the ashtray. 
(T. 54) . 
Responding to defendant's attenuation argument, the 
prosecutor stated: "The officer, based upon the odor of Marijuana 
had probable cause without consent to make a search anyway. . . . 
This is a highway stop and the automotive exception of the 
warrant requirement comes into play" (T. 59). 
The trial court responded: 
I agree. I will make the finding that in 
this particular case, Mr. Means [defense 
counsel], where the officer smelled the 
Marijuana. The defendant admitted to having 
smoked the Marijuana. The officer asked for 
a search of the vehicle. He searched the 
compartment and found Marijuana in the 
backseat as I recall stuffed under the 
backseat the bag of Marijuana, and this is 
sufficient evidence to continue the search 
into the trunk of the vehicle where he 
discovered other evidence. 
Your Motion to Suppress is denied on all 
counts. 
(T. 59-60). 
Clearly, the undisputed evidence supports the trial court's 
finding of probable cause to search the car, including the trunk. 
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£££ State v, Spurcreon. 904 P.2d 220, 228 (Utah App. 1995) 
(finding additional probable cause to search the trunk for 
contraband based on lawful searches of the defendants and the 
interior of the car). 
2. Failure to Preserve State Constitutional 
Arguments for Exigent Circumstances 
Defendant argues that although there was probable cause to 
obtain a warrant, search of the trunk was unjustfied without a 
showing of exigent circumstances under the Utah Constitution. 
For a variety of reasons, the argument fails. 
Notwithstanding defendant's claim to the contrary, neither 
defendant's %xexigent circumstances" or state constitution 
arguments was preserved in the trial court. *[0]ordinarily, [the 
reviewing court] will not entertain an issue first raised on 
appeal in the absence of exceptional circumstances or plain 
error." State V, Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 1311 (Utah 1987); fitaLfi 
v. Price, 837 P.2d 578, 580-81 (Utah Ap. 1992) (same). *Mere 
allusion to state constitutional claims, unsupported by 
meaningful analysis, does not permit appellate review." Dudley. 
847 P.2d at 426; Spurcreon. 904 P.2d at 224 n.2. 
In his motion to suppress defendant merely alluded to the 
Utah Constitution (R. 59, 170).4 Defendant's statements do not 
reference the Utah Constitution by article and section, and do 
4
 The concluding portion of the suppression hearing, i.e., 
argument of counsel and the trial court's rulings, are attached 
at Addendum B. 
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not even mention "exigent circumstances." Plainly, defendant 
failed to alert the trial court that he claimed the absence of 
exigent circumstances, and thereby failed to preserve his claim. 
More emphatically, the statements were utterly inadequate to 
alert the trial court to a sufficiently particularized state 
constitutional claim which it could act upon. 
Moreover, there is no basis for considering defendant's 
argument on appeal under the plain error doctrine or on a claim 
of ineffective assistance of counsel, as defendant suggests, 
because an argument for the applicability of the state 
constitution is not even developed on appeal, except to simply 
cite to State v. Larocco. 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990) (plurality 
holding that under Article I, section 14 of the Utah 
Constitution, warrantless vehicle searches require both probable 
cause and exigent circumstances). £££ Spurgeon. 904 P.2d at 224 
n.2. (refusing to consider an inadequately developed state 
constitutional argument on appeal); Dudley. 847 P.2d at 426 
("Because appellants failed to develop any meaningful state 
constitutional argument below, our analysis must proceed solely 
under the federal constitutional law."). 
Finally, even if defendant's claims regarding the state 
constitution and exigent circumstances were properly preserved, 
their application would effect neither the analysis nor the 
outcome because exigent circumstances justified the search of the 
car. £££ State v. Anderson. No. 940402, slip op. at 13 (Utah 
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February 2, 1996) (search of moveable automobiles requires 
showing of probable cause and exigent circumstances under both 
the Fourth Amendment and article I, section 14 of the Utah 
Constitution).claim For all these reasons, the Court should 
decline to consider a requirement that the State show exigent 
circumstances or that caselaw applying the state, as opposed to 
the federal, constitution should be applied to this case. 
3. Presence of Exigent Circumstances 
*[A] warrantless search is justified where the officers have 
probable cause to believe contraband is contained in the vehicle 
which may be lost if not immediagely seized." State v. Leonard, 
825 P.2d 664, 672 (Utah App. 1991), cert, denied. 843 P.2d 1042 
(Utah 1992). At the time he stopped the car, Sargeant Mangelson 
was without backup support on an isolated section of freeway 
support. Moreover, he was alone with three persons giving him 
evasive answers and intially denying the presence of marijuana 
when its odor was apparent (R. 45, 157). The urgency of the 
situation was fully realized when defendant tried to take off in 
the car being searched, followed by his escape with contraband 
Sargeant Mangelson had just discovered. These circumstances are 
radically different than those in Larocco. where the car was 
parked in front of the home of a suspect who had no idea that he 
was under investigation and there was no indication that the car 
might be soon moved. Larocco. 794 P.2d at 470. 
In sum, the trial court correctly denied defendant's motion 
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to suppress based on probable cause. 
B. Defendant Voluntarily Gave Consent to Search 
1. Consent to Search 
"Although a warrantless search is generally violative of the 
fourth amendment [sic], it is well settled that 'one of the 
specifically established exceptions to the requirements of both a 
warrant and probable cause is a search that is conducted pursuant 
to consent."1 State v. Carter. 812 P.2d 460, 467 (Utah App. 1991) 
(citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte. 412 U.S. 218, 219, 93 S. Ct. 
2041, 2043-44 (1973)), cert, denied. 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1992). 
The trial court not only found probable cause, but it also 
found that defendant gave his consent to Sargeant Mangelson to 
search the car: MNot only that but [sic] got permission from 
Mr. Becker who is the additional driver on the Rental Agreement 
to make the search and that is what he did" (T. 55). 
Defendant does not appear to challenge the trial court's 
finding that he voluntarily consented to the search of the car.5 
Rather, defendant argues that the consent was not attenuated from 
the alleged prior illegality, i.e., the failure to give Miranda 
warnings prior to making inquiries about marijuana. Appellant's 
5
 Defendant's only conceivable challenge to the 
voluntariness of his consent lies in the following phrase, made 
in a different context: *While it appears that the facts of this 
case demonstrate actual coercion on Mangelson's part . . . ." 
Appellant's Br. at 31. The issue of coercion was never raised in 
the trial court, and is, therefore, waived on appeal. Price. 837 
P.2d at 580-81. 
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Br. at 30. 
2. Because There was No Constitutional Violation, the 
Exploitation/Attenuation Analysis is Not Triggered 
In State v. Thurman, the court reaffirmed the test to be 
applied in cases in which consent was allegedly obtained through 
police misconduct: 
(i) the consent was given voluntarily, and 
(ii) the consent was not obtained by police 
exploitation of the prior illegality. . . . 
The parties correctly recognize tht the 
second test--the exploitation test--is 
triggered only if the prior illegality is a 
violation of the Fourth Amendment. 
State v. Thurman. 846 P.2d 1256, 1262 (Utah 1993). 
Defendant does not challenge that Sargeant Mangelson had 
probable cause to search based on his detecting the odor of burnt 
marijuana. Therefore, there is no assertion of a prior 
illegality under the Fourth Amendment that triggers the 
application of the Thurman exploitation test. The only 
illegality suggested by defendant is the alleged Miranda 
violation. Appellant's Br. at 27-28. However, based on 
Thurman's explicit limitation of the exploitation test to Fourth 
Amendment violations, defendant's claim fails. 
Arguably, although defendant does not make the argument, the 
exploitation test might be triggered by another violation of 
constitutional dimension. Se^ Michigan v. Tucker. 417 U.S. 448, 
446-47, 94 S. Ct. 2357, 2365 (1974) (opining that the Fourth 
Amendment exclusionary rule might be applicable to the Fifth 
Amendment "in a proper case"). However, defendant cites no 
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authority in support of the proposition that anything less than a 
constitutional violation would trigger the exploitation analysis. 
Even if there were a violation of defendant's Miranda 
rights, which the State denies, Appellee's Br. at 34-38, such a 
violation by itself would be insufficient to trigger the 
exploitation test because a Miranda violation, without a showing 
of actual coercion, is not of constitutional magnitude. Miranda 
warnings are not constitutional rights themselves; rather they 
are "prophylactic" measures to help safeguard the Fifth Amendment 
right against self-incrimination. Oregon v. Elstad. 470 U.S. 
298, 306, 105 S. Ct. 1285, 1291 (1985). Because the Miranda 
exclusionary rule "sweeps more broadly than the Fifth Amendment," 
a Miranda violation does not compel a finding that an accused's 
Fifth Amendment rights have been infringed. Id. at 470 U.S. at 
306-08, 105 S. Ct. at 1291-93 (citing Tucker. 417 U.S. at 445-46, 
94 S. Ct. at 2364). 
Therefore, because there is no prior illegality of 
constitutional dimension, there is no basis for applying an 
exploitation analysis to defendant's voluntary consent to search 
the car. 
3. Derivative Physical Evidence is Admissible 
Moreover, the fruits of the search were admissible as 
derivative evidence even if Sargeant Mangelson violated 
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defendant's Miranda rights.6 In State v. Troyer. the defendant, 
suspected of committing a murder, was subjected to a non-coercive 
custodial interview without Miranda warnings first being given. 
State v. Troyer. 279 Utah Adv. Rep 11, 12-15 (Utah 1995). In the 
course of the interview the defendant told the detective that he 
had been with his sister on the day of the murder. Id. at 13. 
Following that lead, detectives interviewed the defendant's 
sister, who refused to confirm her brother's alibi. Id. The 
court suppressed the defendant's statements, but found his 
sister's denial of the alibi admissible, stating: 
*If errors are made by law enforcement 
officers in administering the prophylactic 
Miranda procedures, they should not breed the 
same irremediable consequences as police 
infringement of the Fifth Amendment itself . 
Therefore, we hold that where an unwarned 
statement is voluntary and not the product of 
"'inherently coercive police tactics or 
methods offensive to due process" there is no 
Fifth Amendment violation and the fruits may 
be admissible in the state's [sic] case in 
chief. 
6
 Defendant mistakenly argues that the State is 
procedurally barred from raising the admissibility of derivative 
evidence because this issue was not raised in the trial court, 
relying on State v. Mirquet. 844 P.2d 995, 1001 (Utah App. 1992), 
affd. 268 Utah Adv. Rep. at 5, rehearing pending. In Mirquet. 
the State appeared as the appellant, not the appellee as it does 
in this case. Appellees may advance any alternative legal ground 
for affirming a trial court's judgment, even if those grounds 
were not presented to the trial court or were in fact rejected by 
the trial court in the course of entering judgment in the 
appellee's favor. SS& generally Buehner Block Co. v. UWC Assoc. 
752 P.2d 892, 985 (Utah 1988); State v. Gallegos. 712 P.2d 207, 
208-09 (Utah 1985) . 
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IdL (citing Elstad. 470 U.S. at 309, 317, 105 S. Ct. at 1293, 
1297). In so holding, the court cited with approval cases in 
which the derivative evidence was physical evidence. Id. See 
United States v, Sangineto-Miranda/ 859 F.2d 1501, 1518 (6th cir. 
1988) (*We conclude that the cocaine found in the truck 
admissible even though knowledge of the existence and whereabouts 
of the truck were proximately derived from a Miranda 
violation."); United States V, Cherry. 794 F.2d 201, 208 (5th 
Cir. 1986) (murder weapon discovered through voluntary statements 
given in violation of Miranda held admissible), cert, denied/ 479 
U.S. 1056 (1987). 
On the basis of guiding authority, and since defendant has 
failed to preserve any claim that he was subjected to coercive 
interrogation in violation of his Fifth Amendment rights, the 
derivative physical evidence found after the officer's inquiries 
is admissible even if defendant's Miranda rights were violated. 
C. Defendant was Not Entitled to Miranda Warnings 
Because He was Not Subjected To Custodial Interrogation 
Defendant argues that the supreme court's finding of 
custodial interrogation in Mirquet should apply to the facts of 
this case.7 Appellant's Br. at 27-28. 
Mirquet was another case involving a stop by Sargeant 
7
 The State's petition for rehearing in Mirquet. filed July 
31, 1995, is still pending in the supreme court. 
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Mangelson.8 In that case Sargeant Mangelson asked defendant to 
enter his patrol car after having stopped the defendant for 
speeding. Mirquet. 268 Utah Adv. Rep. at 3. Inside the patrol 
car Sargeant Mangelson smelled burned marijuana on the defendant 
and told him: *It's obvious to me you've been smoking marijuana. 
You know, there's no question in my mind. Would you like to go 
to the car and get the marijuana, or do you want me to go get 
it?" Id. The defendant went to his car, retrieved two marijuana 
cigarettes, and gave them to Sargeant Mangelson. Id. The 
officer then searched the car and found more drugs. Id. 
The supreme court affirmed the trial court's suppression of 
the evidence, holding that the defendant had been subjected to a 
custodial interrogation requiring the giving Miranda warnings. 
Id. at 5. In so holding, the court clarified the point at which 
Miranda warnings should be given, to wit: when ^defendant's 
freedom of action is curtailed to an extent associated with 
formal arrest." Id. at 4. In assessing whether or not the 
defendant, who had not been formally arrested, was in custody for 
Miranda purposes, the court applied the four-factor test adopted 
in State v. earner: (1) the site of interrogation; (2) whether 
the investigation focussed on the accused; (3) whether the 
objective indicia of arrest were present; and (4) the length and 
form of interrogation• Id. at 4 (citing State v. earner. 664 
8
 The stop in this case occurred prior to the issuance of 
the supreme court's Mirquet decision. 
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P.2d 1168, 1171 (Utah 1983)). 
In Mirquet. the court was particularly impressed that (1) 
the site of the interrogation was inside the police car, (2) that 
the investigation focussed solely on the defendant, who was 
alone, and (3) that the form of the investigation evidenced a 
coercive intent on the part of the police officer, exemplied by 
the officer's "virtual command . . . to retrieve evidence of a 
crime that was clearly incriminating." Id. at 3-4. 
The facts of this case are substantially different from 
those in Mirquet. First, defendant was merely a passenger in a 
vehicle stopped for speeding (T. 20). Second, at the point 
Sargeant Mangelson informed the occupants of the car that he 
smelled marijuana, defendant was just one of three persons to 
whom the inquiry was directed. Therefore, defendant was not the 
focus of the investigation in the same way as the lone driver in 
Mirguet was. 
Most importantly, Sargeant Mangelson's remarks in this case 
stand in sharp contrast to those in Mirquet. In this case the 
officer said, *I can smell [marijuana] plain as day. I know that 
you are using it." First, it cannot be contended that anything 
other than this remark distinguishes this automobile stop from 
any other routine stop. S&S. Mirquet. 268 Utah Adv. Rep at 5 
("Hinging the issue of whether one is in custody solely, or 
primarily, on an officer's accusatory questioning would lead the 
law into a factual morass . . . • We do not read earner to have 
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contemplated any such thing."). Second, the remark does not 
compel a response, as did the wvirtual command . . . to retrieve 
evidence of a crime" in Mirguet did. Rather, the remarks only 
announce the officer's reasons for believing that the occupants 
had been breaking the law, the basis for notice to the passengers 
for his subsequent request to search. Thus, the officer's 
remarks hardly measure up to the accusatorial character of those 
in Mirguet. 
The stop in this case is more closely akin to that in 
Strausberg. In that case the defendant jack-knifed his 
semitrailer, crashing into car, and continued driving. 
Strausberg. 895 P.2d at 832. The police questioned the defendant 
and a passenger in the cab of the truck just after defendant 
arrived at his father's house, challenging the defendant's 
initial denial of his being in the vicinity of the accident. Id. 
Applying the earner test, this Court found that: (1) the 
setting, i.e., the truck cab, was a site substantially free from 
compulsion and one in which most investigatory traffic stops 
occur, which do no require Miranda warnings; (2) while the 
defendant was a suspect, a passenger was also questioned; (3) 
there were no more indicia of arrest, i.e., handcuffs, locked 
doors or drawn weapons, than in any other traffic stop,; and (4) 
the officer's inquiry about the defendant's whereabouts, 
including his informing the defendant that witnesses at the scene 
of accident had described a truck similar to his, was not 
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coercive. Id. at 833. 
In the light of Strausberg. and considering the 
distinctions from Mirquet. this Court should affirm the trial 
court's implicit rejection of defendant's Miranda claim. 
Moreover, even if this Court found defendant's Miranda claim 
meritorious, suppression would not be warranted based on pre-
existing probable cause, defendant's voluntary consent and the 
admissibility of derivative physical evidence where there is no 
concommitant showing of a constitutional violation, as argued 
above. Appellee's Br. at 24-34. 
POINT III 
DEPENDANT WAS NOT ENTITLED TO A LESSER 
INCLUDED OFFENSE INSTRUCTION BECAUSE THERE 
WAS NO RATIONAL BASIS IN THE EVIDENCE TO 
SUPPORT AN ACQUITTAL ON THE CHARGED OFFENSE 
AND A CONVICTION ON THE REQUESTED LESSER 
INCLUDED OFFENSE 
Defendant was charged with theft, a second degree felony, 
and the jury was instructed accordingly. Defendant requested 
both third degree felony and class A misdemeanor joyriding 
instructions. The trial court granted defendant's request for 
the third-degree felony joyriding instruction (failure to return 
vehicle in 24 hours), but denied the request for the class A 
misdemeanor instruction (temporary deprivation).9 
9
 The trial court's instructions on theft (Jury Instruction 
#6, R. 213) and third degree felony joyriding (Jury Instruction 
#7, R. 212), and defendant's requested class A misdemeanor (R. 
120) jury instruction (R. 45, 157), are attached at Addendum C. 
The statutes upon which these jury instructions are based, Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1995) and Utah Code Ann. §§ 41-la-1314, -
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Defendant claims that the trial court erred in refusing to 
instruct the jury on class A misdemeanor joyriding because the 
evidence at trial was sufficient to show that he had the "intent 
to temporarily deprive the owner" of her property. Appellant's 
Br. at 31, 34. However, because there is no rational basis in 
the evidence that defendant intended to temporarily deprive the 
owner of possession of the vehicle, the trial court did not err 
in refusing to give the requested lesser included offense 
instruction. 
A. The Law. 
Under State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152 (Utah 1983), two 
conditions must be satisfied before a trial court is required to 
give a defense requested lesser included offense instruction: (1) 
the statutory elements of the offense charged must overlap with 
those of the included offenses; and (2) the evidence adduced at 
trial must provide a rational basis for a verdict acquitting 
defendant of the offense charged and convicting him or her of the 
included offense. Id. at 158-59. 
In this case defendant mistakenly argues that the second 
prong of Baker is satisfied, thus entitling him to the lesser 
included offense instructions.10 Appellant's Br. at 34. 
1311 (1993), respectively, are set out in Addendum A. 
10
 "The first prong of the Baker analysis is essentially a 
mechanical, side-by-side comparison of the statutorily defined 
elements of the crimes.11 State v. Singh. 819 P.2d 356, 360 (Utah 
App. 1991), cert, denied. 823 P.2d 476 (Utah 1992). The State 
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However, defendant's analysis is flawed in both its assessment of 
the evidence supporting his convictions and in failing to 
recognize that he could not be acquitted of the greater charge 
and, simultaneously, convicted of the lesser using the evidence 
adduced at trial. Moreover, because the jury refused to convict 
defendant on third-degree felony joyriding in favor of a second 
degree theft conviction, any error in refusing to give a lesser 
included offense instruction on misdemeanor joyriding was 
harmless. 
B. The Trial Court Correctly Concluded 
That The Evidence did Not Support 
A Class A Misdemeanor Instruction 
The evidence adduced at trial supported defendant's 
conviction for theft of an automobile but did not support 
defendant's contention that he intended to temporarily deprive 
the owner of possession. The evidence established that defendant 
broke loose from Officer Mangelson's grasp, ran towards the Tri-
Mart Texaco, crossing two or three fences and railroad tracks in 
the process, and got into a mustard colored car (T. 164-65). As 
defendant was stealing the car, the owner began screaming *my 
car, my car" and "you are taking my car" (T. 165)• The owner 
jumped on the hood of the car and pounded on the windshield. 
does not contest that the statutory elements of the offense 
charged "overlap with those of the included offenses," joyriding. 
SSS. State v. Chesnut. 621 P.2d 1228, 1232 (Utah 1980) (holding 
that theft of a motor vehicle and joyriding both have 
unauthorized use of a vehicle as a common element). 
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Defendant put the car in reverse, throwing the owner off the hood 
of the car (T. 166). 
Defendant turned out of the Tri-Mart and headed in the 
direction of Levan but was never apprehended in the vehicle (R. 
167). Later that day the stolen vehicle was recovered in a 
remote area about a mile and a half from the gas station (R. 167-
68, 196)• The car had been driven through a barbed-wire fence 
and across rocky terrain where it stalled (R. 167-68, 195, 209). 
The car had sustained extensive damage and was inoperable (T. 
209, 351). 
The only defense witness, Lisa LaBarrie, maintained that 
defendant absolutely did not get into a car but ran into an open 
field (T. 309-10) . Thus, the only evidence introduced by defense 
counsel was that the defendant did not steal any car at all, not 
that he intended to only temporarily deprive the owner of her 
property. 
In the absence of any evidence presented of defendant's 
intent to temporarily deprive the owner of the vehicle, the trial 
court was correct in refusing to give the defendant's proposed 
lesser included offense instruction. See State v. Shabata. 678 
P.2d 785, 790 (Utah 1984) (manslaughter instruction properly 
refused in second-degree murder conviction where all the evidence 
the defendant presented at trial was to the effect that he had 
not caused the victim's death). When the trial court denied 
defense counsel's proposed lesser included instruction it did so 
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expressly because there was no evidence that defendant "intended 
to return the vehicle or deprive the owner thereof temporarily" 
(R. 341). Even if the trial court was incorrect on this point, 
defendant would not be entitled to the requested lesser included 
offense instruction. 
c. Based on thg gviflgncgrPefepdant Cwlfl Not Have Been Both 
Acquitted Of The Charged Offense And Convicted 
Of The Lesser Offense 
It is not sufficient that the evidence simply provides a 
basis to convict of the lesser included offense. The evidence 
must simultaneously provide a rational basis for the jury to 
acquit defendant of the greater offense. State v. Baker. 671 
P.2d 152, 157-58 (Utah 1983); £££ State v. Crick. 675 P.2d 527, 
531 (Utah 1983) (defendant not entitled to lesser included 
offense instruction where acquittal of second degree murder 
necessarily required acquittal of manslaughter). 
At trial, the only exculpatory evidence was LaBarrie's 
testimony that defendant did not get into a car but ran into a 
field (T. 286, 309-10). If this testimony were true defendant 
could not have been convicted of any theft, including the class A 
Misdemeanor instruction the defendant claims as error. 
Because LaBarrie's testimony, if believed, would only provide for 
total acquittal of all charges, the trial court correctly 
determined that "the evidence presented at trial did not 
establish any basis on which that lesser included offense could 
and should be given to the jury" (T. 341). 
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D . Any Error in Refusing the Requested 
Instruction was Harmless Error 
In Mincy, the Court found that any error in refusing to give 
a negligent homicide instruction in a second-degree murder 
conviction was harmless because the jury had rejected the option 
of convicting the defendant on manslaughter, an offense requiring 
a showing of intent intermediate between murder and negligent 
homicide. Mincy. 838 P.2d at 659. Therefore, the Court 
reasoned, the jury could not possibly have found the defendant 
guilty of negligent homicide even if it had been given the 
instruction. Id. The same result applies in this case. 
The jury was given the option of convicting defendant of 
third-degree joyriding, which requires a showing that defendant 
failed to return the vehicle twenty-four hours. The jury, 
however, rejected that option in favor of convicting defendant of 
second degree theft, which requires proof that defendant intended 
to withhold property permanently.11 Patently, defendant could 
not have been convicted of class A misdemeanor joyriding, which 
requires only an intent to temporarily deprive, if it refused to 
even find that he intended to deprive the owner of possession for 
11
 Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-401 (1995)# provides# in pertinent 
part: 
(3) ^Purpose to deprive" means to have the 
conscious object: 
(a) To withhold property permanently or 
for so extended a period or to use under such 
circumstances that a substantial portion of 
its economic value, or the use or benefit 
thereof, would be lost[.] 
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the greater period of twenty-four hours. 
In sum, the trial court properly refused to give defendant's 
requested lesser included offense instruction on class A 
misdemeanor joyriding. 
POINT IV 
TESTIMONY THAT THE SACK DEFENDANT ABSCONDED 
WITH WAS RELEVANT AND NOT UNFAIRLY 
PREJUDICIAL IN ESTABLISHING DEFENDANT 
TAMPERED WITH EVIDENCE 
Defendant claims that Sargeant Mangelson's testimony, that 
the sack found in the trunk which defendant ran away with 
contained either crack cocaine or methamphetamine, was without 
foundation, irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial in the State's 
case proving defendant had tampered with evidence. Appellant's 
Br. at 37-38. The claim fails because (1) defendant has failed 
to provide the Court with a record adequate to assess the trial 
court's ruling and (2) defendant misapprehends the tampering with 
evidence offense. Even if the trial court erred in admitting 
testimony identifying the substance in the sack, it was harmless 
because, based on compelling evidence, there is no doubt that 
defendant ran with away with the sack, regardless of its 
contents. 
A. Failure to Provide Adequate 
Record Precludes Review 
Where defendant fails to provided an adequate record for 
review, the appellate court is precluded from considering the 
matter on appeal. State v. Menzies, 845 P.2d 220, 228 (Utah 
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1992) (finding that trial court did not err in requiring 
defendant to produce record demonstrating prejudice, citing State 
v. Taylor. 664 P.2d 439, 447 (Utah 1983), in support). 
Prior to trial defendant moved under rules 402 and 403, Utah 
Rules of Evidence, to exclude "any reference to the investigating 
officer's speculation of the chemical composition, identity or 
nature of the substance allegedly observed by him within the 
paper sack allegedly retrieved from the trunk of the automobile 
in which defendant was seized" (R. 126-27). Defendant's motion 
was heard on July 22, 1992, at which time the trial court denied 
defendant's motion (R. 162). Defendant has not included in the 
record a transcript of the hearing of July 22; therefore, this 
Court is prevented from engaging in any meaningful review of the 
trial court's railing and must decline to consider on appeal. In 
any case, the claim is without merit. 
B. Contents of the Sack was Relevant and not Pre-iudlcial 
Defendant argues that, because the offense of tampering with 
evidence requires only that "anything" related to the 
investigation, testimony that the sack contained either crack 
cocaine or methamphetamine was both irrelevant and prejudicial. 
Section § 76-8-510 provides, in pertinent part: 
A person commits a felony of the second 
degree if, believing that an official 
proceeding or investigation is pending or 
about to be instituted, he: 
(1) • • . removes anything with a purpose 
to impair its . . . availability in the 
proceeding or investigation. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-510 (1995). 
Rules 4 01 and 402, Utah Rules of Evidence, collectively 
provide for the admission of wall evidence having any tendency to 
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the 
determination of the action more probable or less probable than 
it would be without the evidence." It requires no authority to 
show that because the statute makes ^anything" the basis of an 
evidence tampering charge, it is therefore irrelevant, and 
therefore inadmissible, to specifically identify the tampered 
evidence. Without such evidence the State's case would be 
prejudiced by an inability to identify the very investigation 
that was the basis of the charge, an absurd conclusion. 
For the same reason, it is not prejudicial to specifically 
identify the evidence which is the basis of the investigation. 
Defendant argues that evidence of an uncharged crime is 
presumptively prejudicial and that it was, therefore, the 
prosecutor's duty to establish the unusual probative value of the 
evidence, citing Dunn. 850 P.2d at 1221-22 and State v. 
Saunders. 699 P.2d 738, 741 (Utah 1985). Defendant's authority 
has no application to this case. In Saunders the court found 
prior evidence of burglaries inadmissible character evidence in a 
subsequent burglary. In this case, the evidence of contents of 
the sack applies to the very investigation that is basis of the 
tampering charge. Because the evidence relates directly to this 
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case, it cannot be "presumptively prejudicial" to identify it.12 
C. Anv Error was Harmless Because the Evidence was 
Compelling that Defendant Fled with the Sack 
Even if defendant is correct that it was both irrelevant and 
prejudicial to identify the contents of the sack, any error in 
admitting the evidence was harmless because there can be no 
serious doubt that defendant fled with the sack, the minimal 
showing necessary to prove the offense. 
Harmless errors are errors which are sufficiently 
inconsequential that there is no reasonable likelihood that the 
error affected the outcome of the proceedings. State v. Knight. 
734 P.2d 913, 920 (Utah 1987). *For an error to require reversal, 
the likelihood of a different outcome must be sufficiently high 
to undermine confidence in the verdict." Id. 
Sargeant Mangelson testified that defendant fled with the 
sack and that he watched defendant run with it across the field 
(T. 165-66). In support of that testimony, Joseph Walker, a 
trustee in the Juab County Jail# testified that defendant asked 
12
 Defendant also appears to challenge, without much 
conviction, the trial court's admission of Sargeant Mangelson's 
opinion that the substance in the sack was either crack cocaine 
or methamphetamine. Appellant's Br- at 36-37. Defendant cites 
no relevant authority to support his claim, and this Court should 
decline to consider it. State v. Amicone. 689 P.2d 1341, 1344 
(Utah 1984). Moreover, because defendant was never charged with 
the more serious offenses related to possession of cocaine and 
methamphetamine, but rather was only under investigation in 
connection with those offenses, there was no requirement, as 
defendant suggests, to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the 
contents of the sack through expert testimony, i.e., a 
toxicologist report. 
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him to relay a message to LaBarrie, also a prisoner in the jail, 
that he had not been found with any drugs, having stashed them 
and that everything was *okay" (T. 240). While admittedly a very 
impeachable witness on his record (T. 241-258), two facts 
buttress his testimony significantly. First, Deputy William 
Tompkins of the Juab County Sheriff's Office testified that 
Walker had been a reliable informant, whose information had 
repeatedly and without exception always been accurate (T. 216, 
265). Second, Walker told Deputy Tompkins about the message 
defendant asked him to relay the night after defendant was 
arrested, a time at which Walker could not have discovered the 
facts of the case from any source other than defendant (T. 264). 
Only LaBarrie's testimony, that the sack never existed (T. 
285, 305, 313), detracts from the State's case. Her testimony, 
however, is patently unreliable. For example, she claimed that 
there were no "roaches" in the ashtray (T. 281), in spite of the 
fact that a roach was introduced into evidence (Exhibit 159-60, 
206). She claimed that she never saw defendant, a black man (T. 
108) steal the car (T. 286, 311), but a report was received that 
a "Negro" man had stolen a car from the Texaco Tri-Mart at the 
same time Sargeant Mangelson broadcast defendant's flight over 
the radio (T. 240). Moreover, LaBarrie was aware that if she 
were found with cocaine she would be subject to much more serious 
charges that possession of marijuana (T. 313). Therefore, she 
had a very powerful incentive to lie, knowing that the contents 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILINS 
I hereby certify that two true and accurate copies of the 
foregoing Brief of Appellee were mailed, postage prepaid, to 
Douglas L. Neeley, attorney for defendant, 96 South Main 5-15, 
Ephraim, Utah 84648, this ^^ day of February, 1996. 
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of the sack had never been recovered. In sum, the facts compel a 
finding that any error in admitting testimony about the contents 
of the sack was harmless, at most. 
C9NCLVSIPN 
Based on the foregoing discussion, the State respectfully 
requests that defendant's convictions be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ?a day of February, 1996. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General Attorney General 
'KENNETH A. BRONSTON 
Assistant Attorney General 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, AMENDMENT IV 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not 
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized. 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, AMENDMENT V 
No person shall be held to answer for a 
capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless 
on a presentment or indictment of a Grand 
Jury, except in cases arising in the land or 
naval forces, or in the Militia, when in 
actual service in time of War or public 
danger; nor shall any person be subject for 
the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy 
of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in 
any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor 
shall private property be taken for public 
use, without just compensation. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-401 (1995) 
(3) flPurpose to deprive" means to have the 
conscious object: 
(a) To withhold property permanently or for 
so extended a period or to use under such 
circumstances that a substantial portion of 
its economic value, or of the use and benefit 
thereof, would be lost[.] 
Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-401 (1995) 
A person commits theft if he obtains or 
exercises unauthorized control over the 
property of another with a purpose to deprive 
him thereof. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-510 (1995) 
A person commits a felony of the second 
degree if, believing that an official 
proceeding or investigation is pending or 
about to be instituted, he: 
(1) Alters, destroys, conceals, or removes 
anything with a purpose to impair its verity 
or availability in the proceeding or 
investigation[•] 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-1311 (1993) 
(1) It is a class A misdemeanor for a person 
to exercise unauthorized control over a motor 
vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer not his own, 
without the consent of the owner or lawful 
custodian and with intent to temporarily 
deprive the owner or lawful custodian of 
possession of the motor vehicle, trailer, or 
semitrailer. 
Utah Code Ann. S 41-la-1314 (1993) 
(1) It is a third degree felony to exercise 
unauthorized control over a motor vehicle, 
trailer, or semitrailer if the person does 
not return the motor vehicle, trailer, or 
semitrailer to the owner or lawful custodian 
within 24 hours after the exercise of 
unauthorized control. 
Rule 18, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
(e) The challenge for cause is an objection 
to a particular juror and may 
be taken on one or more of the following 
grounds: 
(4) the existence of any social, legal, 
business, fiduciary or other relationship 
between the prospective juror and any party, 
witness or person alleged to have been 
victimized or injured by the defendant, which 
relationship when viewed objectively, would 
suggest to reasonable minds that the 
prospective juror would be unable or 
unwilling to return a verdict which 
would be free of favoritism . . . .; 
Rule 18, Utah Rules of Crlzoinal Procedure (cont'd) 
(14) that a state of mind exists on the part 
of the juror with reference to the cause, or 
to either party, which will prevent him from 
acting impartially and without prejudice to 
the substantial rights of the party 
challenging; but no person shall be 
disqualified as a juror by reason of having 
formed or expressed an opinion upon the 
matter or cause to be submitted to such jury, 
founded upon public rumor, statements in 
public journals or common notoriety, if it 
satisfactorily appears to the court that the 
juror can and will, notwithstanding such 
opinion, act impartially and fairly upon the 
matter to be submitted to him. 
Rule 401, Utah Rules of Evidence 
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any 
tendency to make the existence of any fact 
that is of consequence to the determination 
of the action more probable or less probable 
than it would be without the evidence. 
Rule 402, Utah Rules of Evidence 
All relevant evidence is admissible, except 
as otherwise provided by the Constitution of 
the United States or the Constitution of the 
state of Utah, statute, or by these rules, or 
by other rules applicable in courts of this 
state. Evidence which is not relevant is not 
admissible. 
Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded 
if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
confusion of the issues, or misleading the 
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, 
waste of time, or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence. 
Rule 404, Utah Rules of Evidence 
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence 
of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not 
admissible to prove the character of a person 
in order to show action in conformity 
therewith. It may, however, be admissible for 
other purposes, such as proof of motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or 
accident. 
ADDENDUM B 
Your 
the 
THE COURT 
MR. EYRE: 
THE COURT 
MR. MEANS 
Honor, on the i 
THE COURT 
MR. MEANS 
MR. EYRE: 
position of the 
THE COURT 
I mean there is no ( 
The 
StOf 
was 
: Do you rest Mr. Eyre? 
Yes, 
: Mr. Means? 
We have no evidence to 
issue of the Suppression 
: All right you rest? 
: Yes. 
In argument. Your Honor 
State that - -
: Well, we don't need ar 
evidence to the contrary 
evidence is clear that the officer made 
>. He clocked him in excess of the speed 
a valid traffic 
There is no evidence 
the vehicle and he 
present, 
Hearing. 
t it would be 
gument do we? 
in this hearing. 
a traffic 
limit. There 
stop and that stop was appropriate. 
to the contrary at all. 
smelled Marijuana* burnt 
He approached 
Mari juana, and 
immediately upon approaching the vehicle , smelled 
burnt Marijuana. H 
[ and 
rep' 
e asked them if there was 
if they had been using it and they said, 
lied that 1 can 
Then Mr . Becker 
that Mr, Becker the 
smell it. 
> Marijuana 
, "No," He 
f the evidence in front of this court, is 
n said that we smoked a i roach and 
gestured to the ashtray: The officer then retrieved 1 
the roach froni the 
There is absolu 
ashtray. 
tely complete articulabl e suspicion in 
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this case to continue with the search. Not only that but 
got permission from Mr. Becker who is the additional 
driver on the Rental Agreement to make thesearch and that 
is what he did. He found what he testified in this case 
and the only testimony in front of the court in this 
Suppression Hearing. 
I don't know of a single case that would strike against 
you in this situation. Mr. Means? 
MR. MEANS: I do need to make a record. I am awar^ 
of the case law and there are probably two or three 
cases that allow the officer if he smells Marijuana to 
conduct that probable cause to conduct a search of the 
passenger compartment of the vehicle, because as I read thosf 
cases, that is probable cause to suspect it has been used 
by the people in their immediate presence. 
I will submit the issue to you on the initial stop by the 
way , of whether or not there is speeding so there is 
reasonable suspicion for the initial stop. 
Beyond the search of the passenger compartment , my 
argument is that there needs to be a consent to a search of 
the trunk. Again I separate the passenger compartment 
from the trunk. The consent 1s based upon on the 
representation that Mr. Becker consented verbally and 
said that go ahead that is fine. 
My argument would be to refer to Mr. Harmon's, 
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interestingly enough of State vs. Marquette if I am 
stating that appropriately, Interestingly enough, it is 
also a matter which Officer Mangelson was the investigating 
officer. 
My reading of that case is that when a defendant has 
been asked a question that passes over that line from an 
investigatory question to an accusatory question that 
the defendant needs to be read his Miranda rights before 
he responds. My argument would be that the couching of the 
question to Mr. Becker that as the officer has testified 
to and I hope I am remembering it correctly. I can smell 
Marijuana as plain as day or as clear as day. It is beyond 
that line of Investigatory tut is accusatory and Mr. 
Becker needs to have had Miranda Rights read to him according 
to Marquette prior to his response. 
Since they were not read, then his response would be and 
my argument would be it should be suppressed. That response 
saying that yes it is here and the response afterwards 
referring to the consent to search should not then be allowejl 
to be the basis for the search of the trunk of the vehicle. 
So while I agree with you that the stop is proper and that 
the odor of Marijuana can be a basis for a search of the 
passenger compartment, I believe the court needs to 
determine whether or not there is additional legal 
authority for searching the trunk, and if it is based on 
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the consent or on Mr. Becker's representation is that 
a non-verbal representation that there is a roach in the 
ashtray, and his verbalization that yes we did smoke 
one and that evidence should have been suppressed because 
there was no Miranda warning given. Everything that flows 
from that point on is Fruit of the Poisonous Tree and is 
tainted, 
THE COURT: Mr. Eyre? 
MR. EYRE: To respond to this, this case is 
different than Marquette, In Marquette the officer, Sargeantj 
Mangeison stated that I can smell Marijuana, go get the 
marijuana. Mr. Marquette went and got the Marijuana. 
That is not the case in this case. 
Mr. Becker merely said that we have been smoking 
Marijuana and made some reference to the ashtray. The 
officer retrieved the evidence. He then asked for consent 
and that was not the case in Marquette. There was no consent 
given. 
The officer in this case went and got consent and 
then went and found additional Marijuana within the 
passenger compartment. Clearly,that consent was never 
withdrawn. He clearly still had sufficient probable cause efen 
without consent to make i search of the trunk . If he 
found Marijuana in one particular part of the vehicle he 
has clear additional probable cause to make additional 
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searches. He is going to make a custodial arrest of 
these individuals anyway, There Is going to be an 
inventory search to boot. 
Further with respect to the Marquette Case, it is 
still our position that the Court of Appeals is wrong and 
the Supreme Court has granted Cert on that case and is 
presently before them, the Supreme Court,for the final 
decision as to that issue. 
THE COURT: Do you want to make any response 
to that? 
MR. MEANS: I am not aware of whether or not 
Marquette is up on Cert and I will take Mr. Eyre's 
word for t,hat. I can understand why he doesn't agree 
with the decision but nevertheless as -we stand here today 
that is the state of the law and the ruling of the Court o 
Appeals. 
I need to make one additional point . If you had 
found, Your Honor, that Mr, Becker had given consent and 
the Miranda Warnings are not necessary and he freely 
gave consent then you also need to find whether or not 
that consent was attenuated from his previous seizure 
and the questioning of him by the officer. Again, if the 
•Officer had seized the Marijuana Illegally , because 
in my opinion the reference that Mr. Becker made to the 
marijuana should not have been admitted into evidence. 
Then beyond that point any search just because Marijuana 
Is found in one part of the car legally, doesn't allow 
a search of the rest of the car. It might provide for 
probable cause but it doesn't provide the authority 
to search further, Jt provides a basis for a search warrant 
The consent of Mr. Becker should be attenuated from the 
previous seizure of that Marijuana Cigarette in the ashtray 
if it was not seized properly. The point of the testimony 
that no time passed for Mr. Becker to seek counsel to 
consider his response and all of the factors that are 
necessary in an attenuation. 
THE COURT: Mr. Eyre. 
MR. EYRE: Your Honor, the attenuation would only 
come into play ff there had been a legal search. There 
wasn't any legal search. The officer, based upon the odor 
of Marijuana
 thad probable cause without consent to make a 
search anyway. Since this was a highway stop and was 
not probable cause to obtain a search warrant, is probable 
cause to make a warrantless search. This is a highway 
stop and the automotive exception of the warrant 
requirement comes into play. 
THE COURT: I agree, I will make the finding 
that in this particular case, Mr. Means, where the officer 
smelled the Marijuana. The defendant admitted to having 
smoked the Marijuana. The officer asked for a search 
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of the vehicle. He searched the compartment and found 
Marijuana in the backseat as I recall stuffed under 
the backseat the bag of Marijuana, and this is sufficient 
evidence to continue the search into the trunk of the 
vehicle where he discovered the other evidence. 
Your Motion to Suppress is denied on all counts, 
MR, MEANS: Your Honor, can the record reflect 
that this is the State's first offering of the Marijuana 
Roach. It wasn't offered at the Preliminary Examination, 
THE COURT: I think you have already establishe 
that, 
MR. EYRE: There was reference though in the te 
His testimony is not any different. 
THE COURT: Just wasn't offered as an exhibit b 
it was referred to in his testimony. Whatever it says, i 
says , That can be a part of the record for your 
purpose of appeal if that is what you want. 
MR. MEANS: Thank you. 
THE COURT: Anything further? 
MR. MEANS: Not on the Motion, Your Honor. 
MR. EYRE: No. 
THE COURT: What time is the jury coming? 
MR. EYRE: 1:00 O'clock, 
( WHEREUPON, the Hearing on the-Notion to Suppress was 
concluded) 
ADDENDUM C 
INSTRUCTION NO. f* 
You are instructed that a person commits theft under the laws 
of the State of Utah if he obtains or exercises unauthorized 
control over the property of another with the purpose to deprive 
the owner thereof. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 7 
As an alternative to reaching a verdict on Count I, Auto 
Theft, a Second Degree Felony, you may find the Defendant guilty of 
the lesser included offense of Unlawful Control Over a Motor 
Vehicle for an Extended Period of Time, a Third Degree Felony, if 
you find the following: 
-The Defendant; 
-On or about 7 October, 1993; 
-In Juab County, State of Utah; 
-Exercised unlawful control over a motor vehicle; 
-And did not return the motor vehicle to the owner or lawful 
custodian 
- within 24 hours of the exercise of unlawful control. 
3 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 
As an alternative to reaching a verdict on Count I, Auto 
Theft, a Second Degree Felony, you may find the Defendamt guilty of 
the lesser included offense of Unlawful Control Over a Motor 
Vehicle, a class "A" misdemeanor, if you find the following: 
-The Defendant; 
-On or about 7 October, 1993; 
-In Juab County, State of Utah; 
-Exercised unlawful control over a motor vehicle; 
- not his own; 
- without the consent of the owner or lawful custodian; 
- with the intent to temporarily deprive the owner or lawful 
custodian of possession of the motor vehicle. 
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